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The ‘BRICS Bank’: Many challenges and many opportunities by Pallavi Roy, Centre for International 
Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London 
The New Development Bank (NDB) that was set up in July 2014 promises to be at least for now an 
important part of the discourse on how the primacy of the developed economies in global affairs 
needs to be challenged by developing economies. Popularly known as the BRICS Bank the NDB is 
operated by five of the larger developing economies to build a multilateral development bank (MDB) 
that will first attempt to address a portion of the members’ development funding gaps and at some 
later point lend to other developing economies. The coming together of China, Russia, India, Brazil 
and South Africa to form this bank is not without a sound rationale. These countries have only 11 
percent of the votes at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) despite recent reforms of its voting 
pattern. However together the countries account for 40 percent of the world’s population and their 
combined GDP is over 25 percent of the total global GDP. 
Having said that each country has a different incentive and the implications for each are different 
too. China stands to gain the most emerging from this as a strongly dominant world player that is 
also effectively able to engage multilaterally with other large developing economies, or at least 
signal so. Given the souring of its relationship with the West post the country’s involvement in 
Ukraine, Russia stands to gain credibility by being a part of the New Development Bank’s (NDB) 
founding membership. Brazil and South Africa both have ailing economies, the latter even more so, 
and this might help the two countries shore up some confidence, though the effect might not be 
long lasting. India is in an interesting position given that it sees China both as a threat and an 
opportunity. Being a founder member, however, also adds to the perception that the country is now 
a leading player among emerging economies. 
 A significant challenge for the Bank is to not let the strategic interplay of China and India affect its 
working. The first few months since the announcement have seen no major hiccups but as the Bank 
grows in scale this will be something to watch out for. The Bank recently even announced the 
appointment of its first president KV Kamat a veteran and respected banker from India. On the other 
hand the opportunities for a financial institution that brings together five key developing countries 
are immense. For instance the Bank can serve as a platform for outlining financing strategies to deal 
with issues of productivity growth and employment generation, an area other MDBs do not 
concentrate on directly. However given that the scope of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) is much larger in terms of capital and membership and that China seems to be more ambitious 
about the AIIB because its capital contribution to that bank is larger than the NDB’s initial capital of 
$ 50 billion could mean the NDB risks being somewhat overshadowed. In terms of financing of the 
NDB the subscribed capital of $50 billion is certainly not sufficient for funding significant portions of 
the infrastructure requirements for most of these countries, barring China which mobilized 
resources internally for infrastructure financing. Of course this is the first time that a widely 
diverging set of developing countries have come together in the interests of financial cooperation, 
(though calling Russia a developing country might be not be very accurate) and this is quite 
significant despite the challenges. Also the Comprehensive Reserve Arrangement of $100 billion 
which is to be used in times of balance of payment (BoP) crises might be useful to the member 
countries subject to the conditionalities that are put on the borrowing, in the sense they would need 
to be less restrictive than those usually imposed by the IMF for loans it makes to countries with BoP 
crises.  
 The IMF and the World Bank are still an accurate reflection of US-led global power structures, 
despite the rise of China and hence it is highly unlikely that these two will be competed away by the 
NDB. The threat to the Asian Development Bank which reflects Japanese interests in Asia will come 
from the AIIB and not the NDB. Amidst talk that there is a possibility of Greece joining the NDB if 
there is to be a Greek exit from the Euro what also remains to be seen is how the NDB will invite 
participation from other developing countries in the future. Yet it is clear the BRICS countries realise 
that together they wield considerable political and economic clout and will be taken more seriously 
as one unit and hence are certainly in a position to challenge the primacy of the existing MDBs.  
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